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Abstract. A new way to transpose the virtue epistemologist’s ‘knowledge = apt belief ’ tem-
plate to the collective level, as a thesis about group knowledge, is developed. In particular,
it is shown how specifically judgmental belief can be realised at the collective level in a way
that is structurally analogous, on a telic theory of epistemic normativity (e.g., Sosa 2020), to
how it is realised at the individual level—viz., through a (collective) intentional attempt to
get it right aptly (whether p) by alethically affirming that p. An advantage of the proposal
developed is that it is shown to be compatible with competing views—viz., joint acceptance
accounts and social-distributive accounts—of how group members must interact in order
to materially realise a group belief. I conclude by showing how the proposed judgment-
focused collective (telic) virtue epistemology has important advantages over a rival version
of collective virtue epistemology defended in recent work by Jesper Kallestrup (2016).
1. introduction
A familiar theory of individual propositional knowledge holds that propositional
knowledge is type identical with apt belief. A belief is apt if and only if it is suc-
cessful (i.e., accurate) because competent.1
1The first use of the term ‘apt’ in the theory of knowledge to designate (roughly) ‘success be-
cause of ability’ is due to Sosa (2007); Sosa’s 2007 view is a development on his earlier bi-level
virtue epistemology (Sosa 1991) which predated his defence of epistemic normativity as perfor-
mance normativity. Other pioneers of the ‘success because of ability’ model of knowledge include
Zagzebski (1996) and Greco (2003).
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2When suitably fleshed out, this view has a lot of explanatory power in individ-
ual epistemology. It can, among other things, help us navigate the Gettier prob-
lematic2, the Pyrrhonian problematic3, radical sceptical challenges4, the value
problem5, and more recently, epistemological problems related to the suspension
of judgment.6
What’smuch less clear—and almost entirely unexplored7—iswhether the ‘knowl-
edge = apt belief ’ (K=AB) template view is applicable only in individual episte-
mology, or whether some version of it can be made to work in collective episte-
mology as well, as a thesis about group knowledge.
One way in which things get messy here is as follows. The (K=AB) view is
able to get all of the pleasing results above only when it is understood against a
particular background view of epistemic normativity as telic normativity—viz.,
the normativity of attempts as attempts.8 According to this background view, X-
attempts can be evaluated along three dimensions: for success (did it the attempt
succeed in attaining X), for adroitness (did the attempt manifest a competence
to attain X reliably enough), and for aptness (was the attempt successful because
adroit?). Believing is a kind of attempt, one that aims constitutively at getting
it right (i.e., at truth9). Accordingly, the (K=AB) thesis goes hand in hand with
the idea that only those beliefs that enjoy a certain kind of normative assessment
2Important to this proposal’s strategy for navigating the Gettier problematic (e.g., Sosa
2010a)—given that apt belief can be unsafe—is the bi-levelled distinction between animal and re-
flective knowledge, where the latter is (in short) apt belief aptly noted (e.g., Sosa 2007). Versions
of view that knowledge is equivalent to apt belief have also been defended, outwith the context of a
bi-levelled view, as a solution to the Gettier problem, by Greco (2009, 2010), Turri (2011), Carter
(2016a), Littlejohn (2014), Broncano-Berrocal (2018), and Zagzebski (1996). For criticism of the
‘knowledge=apt belief ’ view, conceived of as a univocal (i.e., non-bi-levelled) proposal aimed at
resolving the Gettier problem, see, e.g., Pritchard (2015, 2012), Kallestrup and Pritchard (2012,
2013), Lackey (2007), and Kelp (2013).
3See, in particular, Sosa (1997a, 2009, Ch. 2). Cf., Carter (2020b).
4Defences of performance-theoretic virtue epistemology in response to sceptical challenges
are found in Sosa (2007 Ch. 2), Sosa (1999), Sosa (1997b), and Carter (2020c).
5E.g., Sosa (2010b).
6See here, in particular, Sosa (2020 Chs. 3–6).
7One exception is Kallestrup (2016), whose work will be discussed here.
8See Sosa (2020, 20–23). A forthcoming articulation of this view, due to Sosa (2020), uses the
terminology ‘telic’ normativity to supplant what was previously (Sosa 2015) termed ‘performance’
normativity. In some places, where substantive differences introduced in the new proposal are not
merely terminological, I will note this.
9Though, for some kinds of beliefs (e.g., judgments), not merely at truth. This point is taken
up in §4.
3qua attempt—the status of being not merely successful and adroit, but also apt—
qualify as known.
Already, though, with above qualifications in play, there is a serious barrier
to getting any kind of ‘knowledge = apt belief ’ view off the ground in collec-
tive epistemology, as a view of collective knowledge. First, as recent literature
in the epistemology of groups suggests10, even if groups can possess knowledge,
it is much less clear that groups can have beliefs, and thus, that they can make
the kind of attempt that, on the (K=AB) view, aspires to knowledge.11 Secondly,
even those collective epistemologists who do countenance collective beliefs often
(though not always) take such collective beliefs to be a function of joint acceptance
of a proposition—viz., whereby a group jointly accepts a proposition, <p>, if and
only if its members commit to acting as if <p> is true in their capacity as group
members.12
But here is the fly in the ointment: individual beliefs and collective joint
acceptances seem, prima facie, like very different kinds of attempts. The latter,
after all, involves intentional action in a way that is broadly analogous to how
individual-level acceptances are intentional.13 But, individual-level acceptances
are not governed by a truth aim. Accepting a proposition, in individual epis-
temology, is not unsuccessful if untrue14; put another way, acceptance is not a
constitutive attempt at truth. The problem now sharpens: if individual belief and
collective joint acceptance are not normatively constrained by the same aim, then
(K=AB) will not be extensionally adequate at the collective level as a theory of
group knowledge, even if it delivers the goods at the individual level.
10See, e.g., Hakli (2006), Meijers (1999, 2003), Wray (2001). For an overview, see Simion,
Carter, and Kelp (2020).
11One complication here concerns the extent towhich ‘belief ’ ascriptions track ‘consciousness’
ascriptions. For some experimental discussion here, see Knobe and Prinz (2008).
12For proponents of this kind of view, see, e.g., Gilbert (1987, 2013), Tuomela (1995), De
Ridder (2018), Tollefsen (2015).
13For discussion on this point, see Alston (2007), Cohen (1992), Van Fraassen (1980), and
Schwitzgebel (2019). For a notable argument that belief and acceptance can come apart in the
other direction—viz., where one believes a proposition but does not accept it—see Bratman
(1999).
14See Van Fraassen (1980) and Elgin (2017) for perspectives on the permissible acceptance of
untrue propositions in the philosophy of science.
42. (k=ab) and substantive symmetry
In light of the above, let’s consider now the salient option space that the (K=AB)
proponent at the individual level has for doing collective epistemology.15
View Individual view / Collective View
Collective Knowledge Scepticism K=AB (Non-sceptical) / K=AB
(Sceptical)
Non-Sceptical Hybrid Traditionalism K=AB (Non-sceptical) / not K=AB
and not K-First (Non-sceptical)
Non-Sceptical Hybrid Knowledge-First K=AB (Non-sceptical) / not K=AB
and K-First (Non-Sceptical)
Non-Sceptical Symmetric View K=AB (Non-sceptical) / K=AB
(Non-sceptical)
Each of these four options comes with some substantial prima facie costs,
though some to a greater extent than others. Option 1, collective knowledge scep-
ticism, submits that if there is collective knowledge, (K=AB) would be a correct
theory of that knowledge; however, since ‘AB’ is on this view held to be not re-
alisable at the collective level, there simply is no collective knowledge. Collective
knowledge scepticism effectively throws in the towel in collective epistemology,
relegating knowledge (and thus epistemology) entirely to the individual arena.
The cost here is significant, given, for instance, the prevailing view in collective
epistemology that there are at least some bona fide cases of distributed knowledge,
viz., caseswhere a group knows something that is not reducible to any proposition
known by any of the individual members of the group.16
Option 2, thenon-sceptical hybrid traditional view, cobbles together the (K=AB)
view at the individual level with some other reductive—viz., non-‘knowledge-
first’—theory of knowledge at the collective level (e.g., perhaps collective knowl-
edge = justified, true, collective acceptance), and maintains that the conditions
specified by this other theory are (ordinarily enough) collectively realised. This
15Note that I’m not considering all possible combinations here that pair (K=AB) with a posi-
tion type at the collective level. For example, combinations that result from pairing the (K=AB)
individual view with a sceptical knowledge-first view or a sceptical traditionalist (JTB-style) view
at the collective level are probably safe to set aside as unmotivated.
16For some representative discussion on this point, see, e.g., Brady and Fricker (2016), Paler-
mos (2020), Bird (2010), Tollefsen (2015), Lackey (2014), Carter (2015), Hutchins (1995).
5view seems to do better than collective knowledge scepticism in one sense butmuch
worse in another. It does better in the sense that it does not throw in the towel
at the collective level. But the cost of the non-sceptical result here is foregoing an
important theoretical desiderata, substantive symmetry, which we can define as
follows:
Substantive symmetry: A theory of individual and collective knowl-
edge, T, is substantively symmetrical if and only if T posits a descrip-
tion of knowledge conditions at the collective level that matches T’s
description of knowledge conditions at the individual level; other-
wise, T is substantively asymmetrical (viz., ‘hybrid’).
Notice thatOption 2, the non-sceptical hybrid traditionalist view is clearly sub-
stantively asymmetrical. This substantive asymmetry across the individual/collective
divide invites a metatheoretical objection: when a view is substantively asymmet-
rical, this substantive asymmetry is (defeasible) evidence that the view is identi-
fying something other than knowledge at at least one of the two levels. And this
generalmetatheoretical objection (which requires further explanation on the part
of the view to address it) gains additional traction once attention is drawn to the
prima facie putative differences between individual and collective believing, and
in particular, to the intentional character of the latter and the non-intentional
character of the former.
Option 3, the non-sceptical hybrid knowledge-first view, avoids a sceptical im-
plication in collective epistemology. That’s good. And it also sidesteps entirely
complications that arise for views—like Option 2—that attempt to vindicate col-
lective knowledge by showing how it can be dismantled into a collective belief
(or acceptance) condition plus other epistemic conditions that are satisfied if and
only if the collective has knowledge. In recent co-authored work17, I’ve argued
that—as a viewof collective knowledge—aK-first view18 hasmuch to recommend
it over ‘justified true collective belief ’ and ‘justified true collective acceptance’ ac-
counts of collective knowledge.19
There remains, though, the lingering issue of substantive symmetry. Go-
ing ‘K-first’ at the collective level achieves substantive symmetry in individual
17See Simion, Carter, and Kelp (2020).
18Such a view would be a kind of collective analogue to the kind of view championed by
Williamson (2000) in individual epistemology.
19For examples of the former, see, e.g., Bird (2010), Palermos (2020), and De Ridder (2014).
For an example of the latter, see Hakli (2006).
6and collective epistemology only if it is paired with a K-first view at individual
level. My co-authors with whom I’ve recently written on behalf of K-first col-
lective epistemology—Christoph Kelp and Mona Simion—are happy to embrace
knowledge-first epistemology at the individual level.20 What this means is that by
going K-first at the collective level, they maintain substantive symmetry, whereas
I would maintain this only by then jettisoning (K=AB) at the individual level. As
the reader will have gleaned from §1, I think it is right to be impressed with what
(K=AB) can do at the individual level21, and more so than with what K-first can
do.
For those epistemologists who like me favour (K=AB) at the individual level,
then, the prospects don’t look initially very good to get ‘everything we want’ at the
collective level, including substantive symmetry. Unless of course, there is some
way to make Option 4, the non-sceptical symmetric view work, despite all of the
worries noted in §1 that seem to stand in the way of defending (K=AB) at the
collective level.
In the remainder of this paper, I am going to argue that—despite things look-
ing very bleak initially—Option 4 really is defensible. (K=AB) can be made to
work not only as a theory of individual knowledge but also as a theory of collec-
tive knowledge. In order to see how the view works, it will be important to dis-
tinguish, following Ernest Sosa (2015, 2020), two importantly different kinds of
beliefs: mere alethic affirmations and judgmental beliefs. While there is (perhaps)
no collective analogue to individual alethic affirmations22, there is a collective
analogue to individual judgmental beliefs. And—here is the second part of the
argument—the collective analogoue of individual judgmental beliefs is performa-
tively analogous with individual level judgmental beliefs, and in this respect, it is
analogously knowledge-apt. By drawing a parallel between individual judgment
and collective judgment, we can see how (K=AB) is not merely a serious option
for individual epistemology but for collective epistemology as well.
20See, e.g., Kelp (2018) and Simion (2019).
21For a recent defence of a new variation of this view in individual epistemology, see Carter
(2020a).
22To be more precise, there is plausibly no collective analogue to at least one species of alethic
affirmation, namely, functional alethic affirmation. See fn. 20.
73. grades of knowledge
Following Sosa, the (K=AB) slogan can be unpacked in individual epistemology
in different ways—corresponding with different grades of knowledge—depending
on the kind of attempt at getting it right that the relevant belief is.
Suppose, for example, that you are taking an eye exam, and you begin losing
confidence as you get closer to the bottom row. But you read out the bottom row
anyway. It turns out your lack of confidence on those bottom-row letters wasn’t
warranted, as you were actually perfectly reliable at the bottom row, despite the
shaky confidence.23
When you affirm a given letter, <p>, on the bottom row, it is an attempt to get
it right (on whether <p>) by affirming that <p>—viz., it is, in Sosa’s terminology,
a kind of alethic affirmation. In the above case, your alethic affirmation that<p> is
adroit (more so than you recognise); and evenmore, your alethic affirmation that
<p> is apt. As such, it constitutes a kind of subcredal animal knowledge, where
animal knowledge is type-identical with apt alethic affirmation.24
So: ‘animal knowledge = apt alethic affirmation’ represents one kind of sub-
stantive gloss of the (K=AB) template. But, importantly, not all beliefs are mere
alethic affirmations, viz., attempts to simply get it right by affirming. Somebeliefs—
judgmental beliefs—are attempts to get it right aptly by alethically affirming. In a
bit more detail for now (see §4 for further elaboration): in judging something to
be so, a thinker aims intentionally to get it aptly right (by alethically affirming that
<p>) on a given question. Apt judgment—i.e., when one’s attempt to get it right
aptly by alethically affirming is itself apt—is knowledge. But it’s not merely the
kind of knowledge you get when a mere alethic affirmation is apt. Apt judgment
is—on the telic virtue epistemologist’s framework—knowledge full well (alterna-
tively: judgmental knowledge).
23Though, not a sheer guess, as one might take when simply flipping a coin and affirming,
before the coin drops, ‘heads’ or ‘tails’. For discussion, see Sosa (2015 Ch. 3) and Carter (2016b).
24Note that while some alethic affirmations, qua attempts, are consciously intentional, others
are what Sosa calls functionally teleological (2020, 50, fn. 27). On this latter point, consider that
right now, for example, your belief—sitting bored in a room—that a clock is ticking, and that the
light is on). As Sosa puts it, such ‘functional’ beliefs: ‘[…] guide everyday action entirely below
the surface of consciousness. Unlike judgmental beliefs, these are not accessed through a simple
conscious response to the relevant “whether” question’ (2015, 67). But they have nonetheless a
teleological aim qua functional representation. As such, such functional beliefs are subject to as-
sessment within the kind of ‘triple A’ framework (accurate/adroit/apt) characteristic of telic virtue
epistemology. For an extended discussion on this point, see Sosa (2015 Ch. 3, fn. 5).
8In sum, then, the (K=AB) template account of knowledge can be glossed—
within telic virtue epistemology—in the following two ways, which correspond
with two different kinds of ‘attempts’ to get it right through affirmation.
What kind of attempt?
What does it
constitutively aim at? What is it when apt?
alethic affirmation to get it right (whether
<p>) by affirming that
<p>
animal knowledge
judgment to get it right (whether
<p>) aptly by
alethically affirming
that <p>
judgmental knowledge
(i.e., knowledge full
well)
As the reader might have anticipated, judgmental knowledge is of particular
interest for the telic virtue epistemologist who wants to embrace a (K=AB) view
at both the individual and collective level, and thus, to retain substantive sym-
metry at the individual and collective levels. And this is because judgment, qua
attempt, involves an intention—where the intention here is to get it right aptly by
alethically affirming. Intention, recall, seemed ex ante to be a property of collec-
tive belief (or collective acceptance) not shared with individual belief. Evenmore,
and unlike mere acceptance, the constitutive aim of judgment is such that, when
aptly attained, what results is a kind of knowledge.
The take away point, then, seems to be the following: a proponent of (K=AB)
at the individual level has a real shot at vindicating a non-sceptical symmetric view
(§2) despitewhat looked like initial barriers. The keywill be to set aside the collec-
tive analogue of mere alethic affirmation and to instead zero in on the collective
analogue of individual intentional judgment.
Here is the plan for the remainder of the paper. §4 will unpack some of the
key features (glossed over so far) of judgmental belief at the individual level, and
in doing so clarify the sense in which judgmental belief is a species of intentional
action on the telic VE framework. §§5-6 then transpose individual judgment and
judgmental knowledge (and its key telic normative features) to the collective level,
establishing a proof of concept of how the (K=AB) template can be vindicated as
a theory of (judgmental) knowledge at the collective level, and one whose condi-
tions are ordinarily enough met so as to be a non-sceptical theory. §7 then shows
that the view has important advantages over a rival version of collective virtue
9epistemology defended in recent work by Jesper Kallestrup (2016).
4. judgment
On telic virtue epistemology, a judgment that <p> is an intentional constitutive
attempt to get it right aptly by alethically affirming that <p>. In order to bring in
to view what a collective analogue of an apt judgment would be, let’s first sharpen
some of the components of individual judgment itself, by briefly answering some
key ‘FAQs’:
(a) In what sense is a judgment an attempt?
There are two ways one might attempt to attain an objective, corresponding with
a distinction between instrumental attempts and constitutive attempts.25 In the
former case, one makes an attempt, at an objective, O, by implementing means
that are both preliminary and viewed as such. Inquirers, for example, might in-
strumentally attempt to know whether there is a chaffinch in the garden by im-
plementing the preliminary means of finding a good vantage point from which
to spot the bird. Constitutive attempts are different. In the case of a constitu-
tive attempt at an objective O, one implements means aimed at O, but not means
which are regarded as preliminary and viewed as such. Rather, one—inmaking a
constitutive attempt at attainingO—implementsmeans that are aimed at ground-
ing one’s success in attaining O. (In an athletic case, compare: instrumentally at-
tempting to hit a hole-in-one by practicing hard for months, and constitutively
attempting to hit a hole-in-one by swinging the club.)
The idea that a judgment is a constitutive attempt to get it right whether <p>
aptly by alethically affirming that <p> registers this constitutive rather than in-
strumental character of the attempt.
(b) So judgments are constitutive attempts. But if the idea is that they are con-
stitutive attempts at apt alethic affirmation (and that they are not merely
constitutive attempts at successful alethic affirmation), then does that mean
that judgments are attempts to domore than just ‘get it right’ (whether<p>)
by affirming’ that <p>?
25See Sosa (2020, 24–26).
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Yes, that’s right. And a helpful way to think about this will be to consider twoways
youmight constitutively attempt to make a basketball shot. Youmight on the one
hand shoot in the endeavour ofmaking it by shooting it. On the other hand, you
might shoot in the endeavour of making it aptly by shooting it. A reckless shot
from too far out—viz., beyond your threshold for sufficient reliability—that hap-
pens to go in is successful relative to the first kind of attempt. It is not successful
relative to the latter kind of attempt, even though it goes in. The basketball coach
will advise a player to take only the second kind of shot (unless the clock is run-
ning out). The second kind of shot, which aims not just at success, but at aptness,
is analogous to a judgment, which aims not just at getting it right, but at getting
it right aptly.26
(c) Even if all of the above about judgment is granted, there remains an ele-
phant in the room. Why should we think that the kind of constitutive at-
tempt at apt alethic affirmation that judgment is should be understood as
a constitutive and intentional attempt at attaining this aim? After all, judg-
ments, like many other beliefs we have, surely aren’t voluntary?
To say that judgment is a (constitutive) attemptm, with intention, to attain a given
aim (to wit, the aim of apt alethic affirmation, or animal knowledge) does not
imply that how we judge is thereby under the sort of voluntary control whereby
we could judge directly through arbitrary choice.27
In order to see why, let’s consider what suffices for the kind of intentional
action that judgment is. To do this, we can distinguish between a basic action
and a ‘simple’ intentional action. Suppose I intentionally move a finger. Or think
of a triangle. These are both deeds I do intentionally, but in each case, there’s
no other deed I do in the endeavour to do these things, either the physical basic
action of moving a finger or the mental basic action of thinking of a triangle.
Affirming that <p> is a basic action. When one affirms that <p>, one doesn’t
do this partly by doing something else in the endeavour to affirm that <p>. Basic
action can be distinguished from ‘simple’ intentional action, where an agent aims
to perform a deed (at t) at least partly by performing a basic action, B, at t.28
26See also Sosa (2015 Ch. 3) for a helpful development of this idea. For criticism see Schechter
(2019).
27For a discussion on this point, see Sosa (2020, 29) and also (2015, 166–7).
28(Sosa 2015, 166).
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Whereas affirming is a basic action, judgment is not; it is a simple intentional
action. Here’s Sosa (2015):
In a judgment, the agent affirms in the endeavor to (thereby) affirm
aptly. If the agent does attain that objective, then, we have the follow-
ing structure: the agent affirms aptly that p at t partly-by affirming
that p at t (2015, 166).
The above sense in which judgment is a kind of (simple) intentional action,
thus, doesn’t imply at all that judging is voluntary in the sense that it could be
reversed arbitrarily—viz., the sense in which researchers widely deny that belief,
more generally, is voluntary.29 Moreover, given that not all beliefs are judgmental,
not all beliefs are intentional even in the above sense that does not imply voluntary
control.
(d) But if judgment is intentional even in the sense described, then couldn’t it
potentially be redirected towards practical ends in a way that is analogous
to how individually accepting a proposition can be practically aimed? If the
answer is ‘yes’, then wouldn’t ‘apt judgment’ be a candidate for knowledge
if and only if apt acceptance is a candidate for knowledge?
Careful! There’s a sense in which judgments are beholden to practical fac-
tors: we might let practical values dictate which inquiries we take up in the first
place—the kind of normativity here (whereby our doing so is better or worse)
is the (broader) normativity of intellectual ethics.30 For example, the lawyer—
in the course of considering the case of a potential client—might make various
judgments about how the law applies in that particular case, all broadly for the
sake of a moral objective: to provide assistance to a vulnerable client. But, in
making these judgments, the lawyer is nonetheless making a constitutive attempt
at knowing with one’s alethic affirmation. (Furthermore, the telic assessment of
a judgment—the kind of assessment that matters for whether the judgment is
knowledge—is not, as Sosa (2020) puts it, ‘properly affected by extraneous objec-
tives that the agent may also be pursuing through the same means.’31
29For additional discussion, see Sosa (2020, 98, fn. 54).
30See, for discussion, Sosa (2007, 89) and especially Sosa (2020 Ch. 2).
31(Sosa 2020, 36). As a point of clarification, Sosa adds here that ‘extraneous aims may define
attempts of their own, and these would be properly assessed by reference to those aims. But
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The above kind of case is very different from constitutively attempting to do
something else (other than to get it right aptly) by affirming, evenwhen that some-
thing else is epistemic. For example, a contestant on a game showwho affirms that
<p> in the endeavour to get it right whether <p>, by affirming, fully cognisant
that they are guessing, is not thereby judging. They are merely alethically affirm-
ing, making a constitutive attempt to get it right (not: aptly right) by affirming.
Likewise, one is not judging if one is engaging in wishful thinking—affirming
what one merely hopes is the case, or, when affirming through speech, what one
merely hopes others believe that one believes is the case.
5. collective judgment
With the key contours of judgment, at the individual level, in mind—let’s now
transpose things to the collective level. As was noted in §1, it is contentious
in collective epistemology, and more widely in collective intentionality, whether
groups can have genuine beliefs, or whether they can merely accept propositions.
A quick clarification is in order. There is no dispute whatsoever that groups
can have beliefs in an uncontentious summativist sense. A group summatively
believes a proposition, <p>, if and only if most or all of its members believes that
<p>. For example: the group that is ‘Swedes’ believes the proposition <Volvos are
safe> in a summative sense if and only if all or most individual Swedes believe
this.
The more contentious, and more philosophically interesting, notion of group
belief is a non-summativist, or alternatively an ‘inflationist’, notion of group belief,
according to which it’s false that the group belief is reducible to an aggregate of
the individual beliefs of group members.
As Alexander Bird (2019) notes, the rationale that has persuaded those col-
lective epistemologists who have embraced an inflationist view of group belief is
that the conditions specified by the summativist account seem in certain cases
neither sufficient nor necessary for a group to believe something. Here is an ex-
ample that challenges sufficiency. Suppose all members of a group (say, a city
council) believe <p> but, in their capacity as council members behave as though
they do not believe <p> (and, where eachmember thinks they are the only one to
their assessment would remain irrelevant to gnoseology, the part of epistemology that concerns
assessment of judgments and beliefs that are truth-directed, and more specifically knowledge-
directed (as has been postulated by telic virtue epistemology….)’ (2020, 36). For some related
discussion, see also (2015, Ch. 9).
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have this ‘strange’ belief that <p>.) It seems like, in this case, it would be a mis-
take to say the city council believes that <p> even though all its members do.32
Likewise, regarding necessity—suppose a group of jurors is evaluating the guilt
of an immigrant whose ethnicity is different from their own.33 The evidence for
innocence is overwhelming, and the jurors—each of whom is privately racist and
believes the defendant is guilty—recognise this, and publicly affirm in line with
the evidence (rather than in line with their racist beliefs) by voting for his in-
nocence. Here, it looks like the jury believes the client is innocent, even though
its individual members do not. Likewise, cases of distributed cognition speak
against necessity: a group might come to endorse a viewpoint, as a group, by way
of a division of cognitive labour dispersed across group members, who have dif-
ferent cognitive roles and then ‘feed’ different bits of information to a centralised
database that collates the information.34
As was noted in §1, the matter of whether we ought, in doing epistemology,
to regard these kinds of cases as ones that feature (non-summativist) group be-
lief has been deeply divisive. The divisiveness has centred around two claimed
disanalogies between belief on the one hand, and so-called inflationary group
‘belief ’ on the other. Thes disanalogies concern (i) automaticity; and (ii) involun-
tariness. Regarding automaticity: As Hakli (2006) reasons: beliefs are paradig-
matically formed in an automatic and involuntary manner (consider your be-
lief ‘There’s a knock at the door!’ which you form automatically after hearing a
knock at the door), while whatever mental states groups are capable of hosting
are not automatic, but rather, the result of careful deliberation. And, regarding
voluntariness: beliefs seem to be essentially involuntary; voluntary affirmations
are ‘make beliefs’, not genuine beliefs. But, group inflationary ‘belief ’ comes apart
from ordinary individual-level belief in both of these ways: group ‘beliefs’ are
never automatic, and always voluntary. So, we should reject that group ‘beliefs’
are beliefs.
The above line of argument against group inflationary beliefs unhelpfully runs
together a number of things that should be kept apart. By being more careful
here, we can make some concessions to the rejectionist about group belief while
upholding a version of group belief inflationism, one on which we can unprob-
lematically attribute judgments to groups.
32See Gilbert (1992, 257–8); cf., Bird (2019, 3).
33This is a variation on a case fromKallestrup (2016), though for other versions, see alsoCarter
(2015, 718, fn. 8), Gilbert (1992, 187), Bird (2019, 3–4), and Simion, Carter, and Kelp (2020).
34See Bird (2019, 3); for related discussion of distributed beliefs attained by aggregating infor-
mation into a central database, see Lackey (2018).
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A first concession to the rejectionist is that anything that is a belief (whether
the host of the belief be an individual or a group) is essentially non-voluntary.35
A second concession is that at least some individual beliefs are clearly automatic,
and, if there are group inflationary beliefs, such group beliefs would never be
automatic.36 What follows from these concessions, about group beliefs, is just
that: groups can’t have beliefs that are either voluntary or automatic.
Does the postulation of a group judgment violate either of these conditions
we’re conceding to the rejectionist? The answer, I want to suggest, is ‘no’. Just
consider the following minimal statement of what a group must do in order to
make a judgment, as construed within a telic virtue epistemology:
(Non-summativist) collective judgment: A groupG judges that<p>
if and only if the G constitutively attempts, with intention, to get it
right (whether <p>) aptly by alethically affirming that <p>.
Such a collective judgment will not be ‘automatic’; it is (like an individual
judgment) an intentional action. But does it matter that we’ve conceded to the
rejectionist that no collective beliefs can be, like at least some individual beliefs,
automatic? No; a collective being unable to produce automatic beliefs, as indi-
viduals can, is of course compatible with it being able to make judgments. For
a thought experiment: imagine an individual who, operated on by neuroscien-
tists, was unable to form beliefs in any other way than by intentional judgment.
This individual would be unusual, disadvantaged even. But this inability does
not call in to doubt the individuals’s capacity to make judgments, not in the least.
Such an individual would therefore hardly be incapable of having beliefs, and
even knowledge (whenever these judgments are apt), and mutatis mutandis, for
groups—analogously unable to believe automatically while capable of judging.
Likewise, the concession to the rejectionist that beliefs can’t be voluntary is not
problematic for the prospects of group judgment. It would be if and only if group
judgments are voluntary in virtue of being intentional. But the kind of intention
characteristic of judgment at the individual level was already shown not to imply
a kind of voluntariness incompatible with any sort of knowledge-apt belief. The
same holds at the collective level, when a group (collectively)makes a constitutive
attempt, with intention, to get it right aptly by alethically affirming. Granted, a
35For a detailed argument on this point, see Hieronymi (2009).
36To be clear, I’m just granting this here to the rejectionist for the sake of argument. There are
actually some reasons, which I won’t get in to here, for thinking that this should not be granted.
See, e.g., Simion, Carter, and Kelp (2020) for discussion.
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group could very well—for example, by jointly committing to a proposition—
make a (collective) attempt to get it right (as a group) in the endeavour to do
something else—for example, to let a proposition stand as the group’s view if and
only if doing so would be strategically wise from a marketing perspective. (For
example: imagine PhilipMorris’ board jointly committing to the proposition that
deaths from cancer are unfortunate.) Even when such propositions are true—
and indeed, even if the individuals of the group know this proposition to be true,
individually—the collective attitude would not be a judgment, as the collective
aim is something other than getting it right aptly. Likewise—and analogously at
the individual level—a group could (if competing in a game show) jointly commit
to an arbitrary answer to a game show question, and in doing so, jointly accept
a proposition by merely (jointly) alethically affirming the proposition, though
without judging.
Let’s briefly take stock. What the foregoing shows is that the basic ‘template’
for an individual judgment, on telic virtue epistemology, can be transferred to the
collective level as a view of (inflationary) group judgment without falling foul of
the kinds of objections that are so often raised to so-called group beliefs. And
this is the case even if these objections (or some version of them) are applicable
to some non-judgmental accounts of inflationary group belief.37
Moreover, the basic view—that a group judgment is a constitutive attempt,
with intention, to get it right aptly via alethic affirmation—is, conveniently, com-
patible with different views of the metaphysical nature of group belief, that is,
different views about what kind of mechanisms have to take place among group
members to materially realise a group belief. Let’s briefly now consider how the
template proposal could potentially be glossed differently on two leading propos-
als types: (i) Margaret Gilbert’s (1987, 2013) joint commitment account; and (ii)
social-distributed accounts, a Durkheimian functionalist version of which is de-
fended by Alexander Bird (2010, 2019) and a cognitive integrationist version of
which is defended by S. Orestis Palermos (2016, 2020).
Consider first Gilbert’s joint commitment model.38 On this view, it is neces-
sary and sufficient for a group to believe a proposition, <p>, that the group jointy
37This point applies, principally, to voluntariness-based objections. The reasons noted above
in this section for why an ‘automaticity’-style objection to inflationary group belief would not
threaten the prospects of group judgment (on a telic VE model) would, as far as I can tell, apply
mutatis mutatandis to other accounts of inflationary attitudes.
38While Gilbert is arguably the leading proponent of the view (in various forms over her
career), other philosophers have also defended variations on this kind of proposal, including
Tuomela (1995) and Tollefsen (2015).
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accepts that <p>. Further, the members of a group jointly accept that <p> when
the members conditionally commit to accept that <p>, which they do if and only
if each is committed to acting as if <p> provided the others do. Thus, on this
view, it is the obtaining of this joint commitment, by individual members of the
group, to act as if <p> is true provided others do, that gives rise to, or ‘realises’,
the group belief.
Here is how a non-summativist account of collective judgment could be given
a metaphysical gloss along the lines of the above Gilbert-style account, according
to which joint commitments are the realisers of group belief. First, we assimilate
a group’s joint acceptance that <p> with (mere) affirmation that <p>, such that
a group affirms that <p> if and only if the group members jointly accept that
<p>. An affirmation is an alethic affirmation if and only if it is an attempt to get
it right (on whether <p>) that <p>. Now, if the individuals in a group privately
desire that the group jointly accept that<p> just in case by doing so they would be
(jointly) affirming truly, would this suffice to make the kind of attempt the group
ismaking (when jointly committing that<p>) an alethic affirmation, and not only
an affirmation?
The answer to this question is ‘no’. The best way to interpret the above sce-
nario is as one of a mere collective affirmation, given that the group itself is not
affirming in any endeavour (for truth, aptness or anything else) as a group, even
if individuals are so endeavouring when jointly accepting (and in doing so, af-
firming) the proposition as a group member. Rather, a group alethically affirms
a proposition only if the group has already collectively established (viz., through
a prior joint commitment) the scope of their endeavour to be an attempt to get it
right (on whether <p>). With this idea in hand, we can now characterise a group
judgment (on the joint acceptance model) in terms of a group alethic affirmation.
To a first approximation, a group judges that <p> only if, antecedent to affirming
whether <p>, the group jointly commits to (i) alethically affirm whether <p>; (ii)
to get it right <p> aptly through (i). The combination of (i) and (ii) establish that
the kind of attempt at getting it right the groupmakes when jointly accepting (i.e.,
affirming) that <p> lines up with collective judgment, rather than, say, withmere
collective affirmation ormere collective alethic affirmation.
Our (non-summativist) collective judgment template can just as easily be given
a very different gloss, if paired with a different view about what realises group be-
lief. Consider, for example, social distributed views of group belief, according to
which cognition involves relatively tightly integrated groups working together,
with scientific research teams being the classic example (e.g., Bird 2010; De Rid-
der 2014; Palermos 2016). On these views, it is in virtue of the social relations at
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work between group members that different parts of the system contribute to the
generation of the system’s collective mental state that <p>, and even if (though
not only if) no individual in the group actually hosts the belief that <p>.39 For
example, suppose a scientific research team—inquiring into whether there are
over 1000 species of a certain kind of bird, B—divides up tasks with the plan of
having each individual input their own data (on the basis of performing certain
individual epistemic tasks corresponding with their roles in the group) in a cen-
tralised database, which then combines the data, spitting out a collective result
in the affirmative if and only if the aggregated data compiled through the shared
database identifies over 1000 species of B. On this kind of view, the group takes
a representational stance on the matter of whether <p> (whether the number is
above or below 1000)—a belief according to social distributed views. And while
the individual members may permissibly also hold the group belief at some point
in the process (e.g., by consulting the database, conferring with each other, etc.)
their doing so isn’t what realises the group belief. Rather, it’s the distributed con-
tributions of the individuals to the collective result in accordance with their roles
that is doing the work.
One internal dispute among proponents of social-distributedmodels of group
belief concerns the matter of how to delineate who exactly should ‘count’ as part
of the group that has the belief it has in virtue of the distributed epistemic contri-
butions of its members. Consider—to use a case discussed by Simion, Carter, and
Kelp (2020)40—the mailperson, whose job it is to bring the mail to the scientific
research team—including some important research documents—and in doing
so, causally contributes to the research team’s group belief <p>. Is the mailper-
son thereby amember of the group that believes that p?41 Intuitively, it seems the
answer here should be ‘no’, despite the mailperson’s making an epistemic contri-
bution to the group belief in light of occupying a social role. Whereas a social-role
functionalist account like Bird’s has a difficult time explaining why the mailper-
son should be ruled out, S. Orestis Palermos’s (e.g., 2016) cognitive integrationist
version of a social-distributed account of group belief can do so easily. For Paler-
mos, the relevant social interactions between groupmembers that serve to collec-
tively realise, via distributed cognitive tasks, a group belief, must include feedback
39For discussion, see Simion, Carter, and Kelp (2020, sec. 3).
40The original example of the mailperson is due to Mona Simion.
41As Mark Alfano has pointed out to me, a variation on this kind of philosophical issue is
on display in cases of adjudicating CERN authorship, especially where research teams are espe-
cially when authorship is large. For an overview of CERN’s practical guidelines for establishing
authorship of large papers, see http://library.cern/cern-author-guidelines.
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loops—viz., two-way causal interactions with other contributing groupmembers,
of the sort that are, on dynamical systems theory (DST), the mark of dynamical
systems.42 Because the causation in the case of the mailperson is asymmetrical
(from the mailperson to the research team, but not vice versa), the mailperson
is not a part of the group that believes despite the causal epistemic contribution
made.
That said, the feedback loop requirement itself may be too strong, as it’s not
obvious that all bona fide members of, e.g., a scientific research team that pro-
duces a result must interact via feedback loops with each other.43 For our pur-
poses, we remain neutral about how a social-distributed model might ‘thread the
needle’ to accommodate the above kind of dilemma. Rather, it suffices to register
that an account of collective judgment could be glossed on a social distributed
model, regardless of whether the relevant social relations are social-functional
contributions (Bird) or reciprocal-causal contributions (Palermos). To a first ap-
proximation, the idea is as follows: A groupG judges that <p> if and only if theG
constitutively attempts, through distributed individual contributions to the group
attempt, to get it right (whether <p> ) aptly by alethically affirming that <p>.
In order tomake this idea concrete, it will be helpful to compare a group judg-
ment, glossed on the social-distributed model, with a mere group affirmation,
also glossed on the model. For ease of reference, let’s suppose we have two sci-
entific research teams, ‘Team Affirmation’ and ‘Team Judgment’, each aiming to
establish—to continue here with our previous example of distributed cognition—
whether there are over 1000 species of bird B. Team Affirmation, low on research
funding, is trying to cut corners. The interactions between groupmembers reflect
this—none of the individuals are accountable for the accuracy of their results (as
long as they register a plausible enough looking number indicating how many
species they have found of bird B in their designated sector). With this kind of
epistemic laxity characterising the social norms in play, the group eventually af-
firms a collective answer (fewer than 1000 species)—and suppose even that this
is true. Even so, we have here a mere (collective) affirmation, and (depending on
42See, e.g., Beer (1995, 2014).
43An example case features in Kallestrup (2016), which involves a single mathematician and
a physicist who do not communicate with each other, but who both—according to an agreed
plan—send their results to a third team member, who applies the modus ponens inference rule
to generate the group position. See also Simion, Carter, and Kelp (2020) for explicit discussion of
the idea that a feedback loop condition will be too strong such that it will have the result of ruling
out individuals (who ought to be ruled in) as part of a group that believes something.
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how the details are further filled out) at the very most, an alethic affirmation. But
Team Afirmation falls short of making a judgment.
Team Judgment—true to their namesake—approaches things differently. The
social norms governing the individual contributions to the collective output, as
well as the interactions between individuals in ensuring reliability in reporting
and collating the individual epistemic contributions, are knowledge directed. Sup-
pose even that these norms are deeply internalised as well as explicit in the re-
search team’s manifesto: individual contributions to the group ouptut are ac-
cepted only if reliable methods are used, and individual epistemic contributions
are even cross-checked by other team members as a matter of policy to min-
imise epistemic risk. Suppose finally that the result is the same (fewer than 1000
species).
Given that both of our two research teams generate, through organised dis-
tributed efforts, a collective representational output (i.e., that there are fewer than
1000 species of bird B), both (on a social-distributed model) count as at least af-
firming this, perhaps even as both alethically affirming this. But only Team Judg-
ment is actually aiming at aptness, and not merely at correctness, in a way that is
characteristic of judgment. Team Judgment is affirming with the aim of (through
the distributed intellectual contributions) getting it right aptly, viz., through not
just any kind ofway of organising and aggregating individual contributions, but—
as the social norms governing their inquiry prescribe—through a reliable, knowledge-
conducive way of doing so.
6. collective judgmental knowledge
Let’s take stock. We’ve seen how judgmental belief can be realised in a promising
way at the collective level such that it is structurally analogous, on a telic theory of
epistemic normativity, to how it is realised at the individual level—viz., through
a (collective) intentional attempt to get it right aptly (whether <p>) by alethically
affirming that <p>. Moreover, we’ve seen that an advantage of the proposal is
that it is in principle compatible with competing views—viz., joint acceptance
accounts and social-distributive accounts—of how groupmembers must interact
in order to materially realise a group belief.
But two residual questions remain.
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Question 1: First, if a collective judgment is to result in collective judg-
mental knowledge (alternatively: in knowledge full well), the collec-
tive judgmentmust itself be apt. What, then, is required in order for a
collective—as opposed to merely an individual—judgment to attain
the status of aptness?
Question 2: How much collective judgemental knowledge is there?
If none, or very little, then the proposed view (paired with a K=AB
view at the individual level) secures substantive symmetry, but not
full-blown non-sceptical substantive symmetry of sort desired.
Let’s now answer these two questions in turn.
(a) An answer to Question 1
Any judgment—just like any (constitutive) attempt, more generally—is apt if
andonly if it is successful and the success is through competence. Aφ-competence,
generally speaking, is a disposition of a subject to succeed reliably enough, when-
ever one makes a φ-attempt and is in proper shape and properly situated. (In
the case of performing a triple axel, for example: if you were unable to succeed
when you attempt to perform the jump while drugged and strapped inside an
airplane—away from an ice rink—this would not count against your competence
to land a triple axel. What matters is whether you’d succeed reliably enough if
you tried while in proper shape (undrugged) and properly situated for such an
attempt (equipped with skates, on an ice rink, plenty of ambient oxygen, etc.).
‘Successful’ judgment is equivalent to apt alethic affirmation—viz., that which
judgment, as such, is a constitutive attempt to bring about. And so: a competent
judgment is a judgment that manifests a disposition (on the part of the judging
subject) to (reliably enough) succeed at doing that—viz., that which constitutes
successful judgment. An individual thinker, for example, would possess such a
competence only if disposed to reliably enough affirmalethically only if shewould
do so aptly. In light of such a competence, the thinker not easily would fail to
affirm with alethic aptness.
In sum, then: a judgment is apt just in case its success, that is, its securing
the aim of apt alethic affirmationmanifests (or: is because of) one’s disposition to
(reliably enough) affirm alethically only if one would do so aptly. We can now—
drawing from our template account of collective judgment from §5—extend this
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account of apt judgment to the special case of where the judgment is a collective
judgment as follows:
(Non-summativist) collective apt judgment (i.e., collective judg-
mental knowledge): A group G judges that <p> aptly if and only if
G constitutively attempts, intentionally, to get it right (whether <p>)
aptly by alethically affirming that <p>; (ii) G secures this aim; and
(iii) G’s securing this aim manifests (or: is because of) G’s disposi-
tion to (reliably enough) collectively affirm alethically whether <p>
only if G would do so aptly.
Important here are two key points, the first of which has to do with clause
(iii)—viz., the idea that Gmust have a disposition—one that it manifests in judg-
ing successfully—to (reliably enough) collectively affirmalethically only ifGwould
do so aptly. This disposition, it should be emphasised, is a disposition of the judg-
ing group, one the group has in an inflationary sense, such that it’s false that the
group possesses the disposition if and only if individuals in the group possess this
disposition.
The second idea concerns the ‘because of ’ locution. Even if a group judgment
is both successful (i.e., it results in apt alethic affirmation) and competent, it might
still fall short of being apt, qua judgment, if the group’s success is not because
competent.44 Suppose, for example, that a research team competently judges that
<p>, and further, that <p> is true. However, here’s the twist: due to a fluke error
in some of the computer equipment that the group uses to take the measure of its
members’ individual contributions to the group judgment (whether it be a joint-
commitment-registering machine, in a Gilbert-style model, or a data aggregating
machine, on a social-distributed model), the machine first (i) incorrectly regis-
ters the group’s view as not-<p>; but, then, (ii) a second computer glitch occurs,
causing the machine to issue an arbitrary result that happens to be <p>. In this
case, the group lacks judgmental knowledge, (and even apt alethic affirmation)
as the fact that the group affirms what it does rather than something else is not
due to any kind of competence but just to dumb luck.45
44Compare here with the ‘double gust of wind’-style cases that are familiar in virtue reliabilist
epistemology to illustrate aptness (e.g., Sosa 2007, 2010a; Pritchard 2012; Greco 2010, Chs. 5-6).
45Couched in slightly different language: the structure of this case involves intervening luck
(see, e.g., Pritchard 2005). Whereas intervening luck is incompatible with aptness, more contro-
versially, environmental luck is compatible with it. Though this point will not concern us here.
For recent discussion on full aptness and its relationship with risk, see Carter (2020a).
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(b) An answer to Question 2
In answering Question 2—about whether group judgmental knowledge is, on
the proposal advanced here, about as common as we’d expect—I want to draw
a brief parallel to the individual level. Is individual judgemental knowledge rare?
Why would we think it is? Three kinds of arguments that might try to establish
this (none of which is very persuasive) go as follows: group judgmental knowl-
edge would plausibly be rare, on the telic theory proposed, if (i) all knowledge—
judgmental or otherwise—is rare due to the epistemic hostility of our environ-
ment (e.g., if we are being often deceived); (ii) if there are barriers to individuals
performing the act of judgment given what this involves on telic virtue episte-
mology; (iii) if judgment itself (as it is understood on telic virtue epistemology)
is—despite there being no barriers to performing it—rarely performed nonethe-
less.
I’m going to set aside (i) out of hand, as it has very little bearing on what’s of
interest here, given that its implications concernmuchmore than just judgmental
knowledge. That said, (ii) and (iii) concern judgmental knowledge more directly.
Regarding (ii): We’ve seen in §4 that typical arguments against the possibility of
voluntary beliefs cut no ice against the idea that judgments are a species of inten-
tional action. However, with this point established, it’s unclear why there should
be any barrier to individual judgment, or (iii) for that matter, why—given our in-
terest in getting it right knowledgeably (rather than just getting it right any way)
when we inquire—judgment is something an individual would rarely perform.
The point of working through the implausibility of any of (i-iii) as reasons to
doubt that judgmental knowledge at the individual level is about as widespread
as we’d expect is that the same rationale extends—mutatis mutandis—to the col-
lective level. Again, setting aside (i), let’s consider (ii). §5 showed in some detail
why typical objections to the countenancing of inflationary group beliefs do not
carry over to (inflationary) group judgment, at least as it is construed within a
telic framework. Regarding (iii): there is no reason at all to think that such col-
lective judgments are rare. On the contrary: collective judgment (as opposed
to collective mere alethic affirmation) plausibly best describes what scientific re-
search teams often do when endeavouring not merely to get it right any old way
on a particular inquiry, but to get it right knowledgeably, and on this point juries
are no different.46
46For a more general defence of idea the that knowledge (rather than truth) is the norm of
science, see Bird (2007a); Bird (2007b). For criticism, see Rowbottom (2008). Likewise, for de-
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7. a comparison
There is one other attempt in the literature to extend the (K=AB) model from in-
dividual to collective epistemology, due to Jesper Kallestrup (2016), in his paper
‘Group Virtue Epistemology’. There is a lot to like about Kallestrup’s project. For
one thing, Kallestrup maintains that there is ‘nothing in [Sosa’s] framework pre-
cludes ascriptions of knowledge to group agents.’ Agreed. Even more, Kallestrup
accepts inflationary (i.e., irreducibly collective) epistemic properties in his con-
cession that it is ‘perfectly possible for groups to instantiate epistemic properties
none of their members instantiate’. Also agreed. Thirdly, Kallestrup thinks that
the right way to think of group knowledge is as apt belief, and even more, his po-
sition allows that a ‘group may form apt beliefs none of its members share’. This
third point, along with the other two, line up exactly with my own thinking.
But Kallestrup and I—despite traveling the same road, from individual to
collective epistemology, part of the way—diverge at several important places. I
want to conclude by showing why I think that the view defended here, and not
Kallestrup’s, gets it right on these key points of divergence.
(a) First point of divergence
According to Kallestrup, while a groupmay form apt beliefs that none of itsmem-
bers share, the ‘competence’ of a group is nothing over and above the compe-
tences of its members when suitably combined. He writes:
Novel competences of groups do not spring into existence or mys-
teriously emerge when conjoining existing individual ones. On the
other hand, the aptness of group belief is not similarly reducible to
the aptness of the beliefs of its individual members (2016, 10).
In a bit more detail, Kallestrup’s contention is that the following thesis is true
of group competences but false of knowledge qua apt belief
Reductive individualism: all (or at least most) of the members of g
having E-type properties is necessary and sufficient for g having E.
(2016, 10–11).
fences of the idea that a knowledge norm, rather than any weaker norm, governs assessments of
whether to convict in criminal proceedings, see Littlejohn (2017) and Blome-Tillmann (2017).
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There are two problems with this view. Firstly, empirical evidence for cases
of ‘Mandevellian intelligence’ indicate that reductive individualism does not hold
for group competences.
Cases of Mandevillian intelligence, in short, indicate that such a reduction
is problematic because some dispositions that are unreliable and thereby are not
individual-level competences can, and reasonably often enoughdo, lead to knowledge-
conducive dispositions at the collective level, particularly when these individual-
level shortcomings play the de facto role of generating cognitive diversity within
a group. In a series of recent papers reviewing these kinds of cases, Paul Smart
(2018a, 2018b) has noted individual-level ignorance, extreme-thinking and for-
getfulness as (somewhat paradoxically) among the individual level traits that have
been reported as contributing to epistemic benefits at the group level.47 Whereas
the countenancing ofMandevillian intelligence cases is incompatiblewithKallestrup’s
reductive individualism about group-level competences, it is compatible with my
proposal which, unlike Kallestrup’s, does not make this commitment.
A second problem for Kallestrup’s reductive individualism about group com-
petence is that it is paired with non-reductive individualism (i.e., the denial of
reductive individualism) about group knowledge qua apt belief. This pairing is
unstable in the following way: it posits a non-reductive subject as possessing an
apt belief while denying that the same subject, the subject to whom knowledge is
attributable, can possess a competence. This pairing implies that Kallestrup must
reject the following which is analytically true within the kind of virtue-theoretic
framework he takes himself to be operating: a subject, S, has an apt belief only if
S has a competent belief.
(b) Second point of divergence
Asecondpoint of divergence concerns theoretical neutrality. According to (K=AB)
proposals, knowledge is a normative (epistemic) kind, not a psychological kind.
Such theories, at the individual level, do not carry any heavy-duty commitments
about how beliefs are materially realised in themind of a knower. For this reason,
a proponent of (K=AB) at the individual level could potentially be paired with
various kinds of views about beliefs in the philosophy of mind, e.g., from rep-
resentationalism to functionalism.48 The version of the (K=AB) template opted
47For representative empirical literature describing cases of Mandevillian intelligence, see
Zollman (2010) and Xu, Liu, and He (2016).
48For an overview of some additional options, see Schwitzgebel (2019, sec. 1).
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for here (§5) was shown to be compatible with very different theories of what
has to happen to realise a knowledge-apt collective judgment. In this respect,
the proposal is, like individual-level (K=AB) views, theoretically neutral about
the conditions on realising belief. Kallestrup’s proposal, by contrast, weds itself
to several heavy-duty commitments on this front. To give one such example,
for Kallestrup, an (inflationary) group belief is brought about, through the ac-
tivity of individual members, only if those individuals’ contributions are made
(i.e., only if the individuals form the beliefs they form) because they believe that
others intend to make the certain prescribed individual contributions towards
the group attitudes (2016, 13). This caveat alone will make the view off limits to
social-distributed views that lack any such explicit requirement. Even more, the
view seems to generate some implausible predictions. For example, the view pre-
dicts that a scientific research team fails to generate group belief (and thus group
knowledge) if each individual on the research team, in short, would have kept on
working exactly as they had even had the others bunked off. And this looks like
the wrong result.
(c) Third point of divergence
The third point of divergence concerns the matter of ‘screening off ’ rejectionist-
style objections from voluntariness. Just as individual-level acceptance is volun-
tary in a way that individual-level knowledge-apt belief is not, likewise—and this
is just a restatement of the kind of point that has been made by various rejection-
ists about group belief (see §5)—a voluntary acceptance (joint or otherwise) of a
proposition is not a knowledge-apt belief.
I’ve shown how collective judgments, though intentional, are not just usually,
but essentially, not voluntary, and this result falls out of the normative structure
of judgment as a distinctive kind of constitutive attempt, as understood within a
telic virtue epistemology.
Kallestrup’s proposal, at the collective level, does not (as mine does) unpack
the (K=AB) template as a thesis about collective judgmental knowledge specifically—
knowledge that implicates an intentional (and successful) constitutive aiming at
aptness of alethic affirmation rather than at any other end—but rather, as a thesis
about collective knowledge more generally, knowledge generated whenever col-
lective ‘belief ’ is apt.49 But here is the problem: there is nothing in this proposal
49As it will be, on Kallestrup’s proposal, if the belief ’s truthmanifests a (individually reductive)
competence to reliably enough generate true beliefs.
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that screens off the objection that group ‘beliefs’ aren’t genuine (knowledge-apt)
beliefs, given that—in light of how Kallestrup has described their conditions of
realisation—they could in principle be brought about voluntarily. After all, on
Kallestrup’s proposal, group beliefs—even though they purport to describe the
world and as such are attitudes with amind-to-world direction of fit—can be gen-
erated and reversed arbitrarily by a group so long as the group satisfies (following
List and Pettit (2006)) conditions whereby the group acts intentionally to have
that attitude stand as the group’s attitude (see, e.g., 2016, 13). But then, and taking
a wider view, susceptibility to this kind of criticism leaves Kallestrup’s version of
collective virtue epistemology one that preserves substantive symmetry (see §2)
only the cost of inviting the charge that the view is not suitably non-sceptical at
the collective level, even if substantively symmetrical.
8. concluding remarks
In sum, the simple idea, powerful in individual epistemology, that knowledge =
apt belief is not a ‘one trick pony’. It can be made to work at the collective level as
well. But in order to make it work, we have to understand how to make it work,
and that requires availing ourselves of the full theory of telic epistemic norma-
tivity, within which we can distinguish different kinds of beliefs in light of the
distinctive kinds of constitutive attempts they are at getting it right. With this in
mind, the view is that ‘K=AB’ is correct theory of knowledge at the collective level
as a theory of collective judgmental knowledge, or of apt judgment. Understood as
such, the view was shown to be insulated against standard fare criticisms of col-
lective belief that would seem, prima facie to pose problems for any account of
collective knowledge that is ‘built’ out of any sort of collective belief. Moreover,
the view is shown to diverge from an alternative view of collective virtue episte-
mology defended by Jesper Kallestrup in three important ways—and I’ve argued
why, at each of these three forks in the road, there are key advantages to throwing
in with the theory defended here.50
50Thanks also to Mark Alfano for helpful comments on a previous version of this paper. This
paper was written as part of the Leverhulme-funded ‘A Virtue Epistemology of Trust’ (#RPG-
2019-302) project, which is hosted by the University of Glasgow’s COGITO Epistemology Re-
search Centre, and I’m grateful to the Leverhulme Trust for supporting this research.
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